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Introduction 
Can emerging democracies from the global south provide new inspiration for the gradual 
democratisation of the global system? The largely undemocratic nature of the global system is 
certainly one decisive reason for the collective failure to find far-reaching and sustainable 
answers to global challenges such as the regulation of the Internet.1 Several scholars suggest 
that more democratic forms of cooperation need to be designed as a potential alternative to the 
current practices of intergovernmental decision-making processes on the global stage.2  
But how to democratise a system which is known for its unjust, unequal and 
undemocratic nature? Many scholars have advocated a reform of important intergovernmental 
organisations,3 an increased role for civil society organisations,4 transnational companies5 or 
governance networks6. In a particularly Western-centred debate,7 few scholars have spent their 
time exploring what emerging democracies from the global south may contribute to these 
democratisation efforts. By IRFXVLQJRQ%UD]LO¶V8 organisation of the 2014 NETmundial Global 
Stakeholder Meeting on the Future of the Internet, this article argues that we may learn one or 
two things from Brazil on how to move forward this debate in global Internet governance.  
 The Brazilian organisers of the NETmundial Meeting were inspired by the development 
RI%UD]LO¶VRZQ5HJXODWRU\)UDPHZRUNIRUWKH,QWHUQHWZKLFKHVWDEOLVKHGPLQLPXPFRQGLWLRQV
such as civil rights, duties, and principles for the use of the internet in Brazil.9 Its fundamental 
principles refer to guaranteeing privacy and the protection of personal data, net neutrality (web 
contents and users are treated equally without limiting or blocking the access to particular 
websites, contents or applications), freedom of expression, etc.10 The Framework was praised 
as an inspiring model for countries worldwide by transnational civil society organisations and 
renowned internet experts like Vint Cerf, Tim Berners-Lee or Steve Crocker for establishing 
rules for the use of the Internet and the protection of Internet users.11   
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7KLV DUWLFOH DUJXHV WKDW %UD]LO¶V LQQRYDWLYH DQG GHPRFUDWLF RUJDQLVDWLRQ RI WKH 
NETmundial Multi-stakeholder Meeting breathed new life into the debates on how to move 
forward on regulating the global use of the Internet in a democratic fashion. The remaining 
chapters are organised as follows. First, I briefly introduce the multi-stakeholder model and its 
shortcomings in the global governance of the Internet. Then, I present three democratic 
elements (the promotion of human rights, participation and accountability) widely discussed in 
the literature on normative democratic theory and global democracy, which are essential for 
multi-stakeholder models to turn into efficient and democratic decision-making processes. 
7KHUHDIWHU,H[DPLQH%UD]LO¶VRUJDQLVDWLRQRIWKH1(7PXQGLDO0HHWLQJDQGDQDO\VHWRZKLFK
extent the Meeting can be regarded a democratic and successful stakeholder process.  
 
 
Advancing democratic processes in the global governance of the Internet 
The global system is essentially polycentric with different centres of control and influence, 
fragmented without a central coordinating authority and lacking a global dêmos with political 
boundaries which would clearly delineate the institutions and mechanisms of the democratic 
process.12 In this highly decentralised environment, political processes evolve increasingly 
around issue-areas rather than territorial boundaries.13 Issues like the global regulation of the 
Internet do not respect the boundaries of nation-states. In a context where many issues are no 
longer associated with a particular territory, intergovernmentalism may not be an adequate 
model to effectively deal with these issues.  
The multi-stakeholder approach represents a potential alternative to the sole 
coordination of states and intergovernmental organisations. According to Terry Macdonald, 
³WKHIDFWWKDWWKHPXOWL-stakeholder model represents individuals by issue-area rather than by 
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territorial location or nationality ensures that it is better equipped than the nation-state model to 
DFFRPPRGDWHWKHHPSLULFDOUHDOLW\RIWHUULWRULDOO\GLVSHUVHGLQWHUHVWVZLWKLQJOREDOVRFLHW\´14 
As such, in a multi-stakeholder approach, all those stakeholders affected by a particular political 
decision should be involved in the decision-making process including various actors from civil 
society, the private sector, individuals and the states. In the multi-stakeholder approach the 
states, which are the principal actors in the global system, form just one group of many and are 
required to treat other stakeholders as equal partners.15  
The multi-stakeholder model is not a panacea to deficits and shortcomings in global 
cooperation efforts. Based on its objective to reach consensus among its stakeholders, the model 
completely relies upon deliberative processes. But what if consensus is hard to reach in some 
circumstances? Then the model may get marginalised and sidelined by influential actors.16 Or 
if the equal access of different stakeholders, which naturally differ in terms of resources, cannot 
be guaranteed?.17 Then, less influential actors may abandon the model undermining the 
legitimacy of the whole approach. While the inclusion of other non-state actors in global 
decision-making processes seems to be a sensible idea, many doubts exist about its 
effectiveness and its role in the democratisation of global governance processes. The global 
governance of the Internet provides an insightful example of how challenging it is to make the 
multi-stakeholder approach work.  
In the global governance of the Internet, stakeholder approaches are a fundamental 
element of decision-making processes, alongside intergovernmental approaches. One of the 
leading bodies in Internet governance, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN), is governed by several stakeholders. A private non-profit organisation 
based in the US (California), ICANN coordinates the allocation of domain names and root 
server computers.18 Given its status as a private actor dealing with very technical issues, 
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JRYHUQPHQWUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVIRULQVWDQFHDUHQRWDOORZHGWRVLWRQ,&$11¶VSULQFLSDOGHFLVLRQ-
making board.19  
Between 2002 and 2005, the UN organised the UN World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS) process, which should clarify fundamental issues in Internet governance, 
among them the role of ICANN, non-state actors and intergovernmental cooperation.20 
Although several thousand people from governments, civil society, the private sector and other 
stakeholder groups were present to talk about new ways to govern the Internet, the summit 
process was characterised as a failure. 21  It was overall ineffective in producing any worthwhile 
documents which could have served as a basis for all stakeholders involved on how to proceed 
in the global governance of the Internet.22  
While failing to produce actual outcomes, WSIS shifted the spotlight to non-state actors 
and came up with a definition of Internet governance conceding an important role to non-state 
actors, while still upholding the dominance of the states: 
Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the private 
sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, 
decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the 
Internet.23 
Another outcome of this process was the creation of a global multi-stakeholder forum which 
was to become the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).24 The IGF, however, turned into a hollow 
mechanism without any real decision-making power and has been unable to produce real 
progress on how to move forward in Internet governance.25 It is striking that in Internet 
governance, where ICANN as one of its principal organisations is governed by several 
stakeholders, multi-stakeholder models have failed to effectively democratise decision-making 
processes.  
 5 
 
 In the face of these failures, this article argues that multi-stakeholder processes need to 
reinforce three democratic elements prominent in the literature on normative democratic theory 
and global democracy to promote democratic and efficient decision-making processes. These 
elements are (1) the promotion of human rights, (2) the creation of mechanisms for the (full) 
participation of non-state actors and (3) the establishment of mechanisms of authorisation and 
accountability.26 
 
The Promotion of Human Rights 
Activities directed towards promoting and progressively realising human rights constitute one 
important element of more democratic processes at  the global level. Although disagreement 
exists  about how to exactly advance global democratic processes, numerous scholars do agree 
on the importance of human rights for those processes.27 Goodhart, for instance, argues that a 
IRFXVRQKXPDQULJKWV³VKLIWVWKHIRFXVDZD\IURPLQVWLWXWLRQVPHFKDQLVPVDQGSURFHGXUHV
DQGEDFNWRWKHFRUHYDOXHVXQGHUO\LQJWKHP´28. Any system, which can be realistically called 
democratic, is founded on a range of basic values such as freedom and equality and has to live 
up to these very same values.29 +XPDQULJKWV³LQFOXGHWKHDEVHQFHRIFRQVWUDLQWVVXFKDVWKUHDWV
to bodily security, or restrictions on liberty (including freedom from domination), as well as a 
VHWRIHQDEOLQJPDWHULDODQGVRFLDOFRQGLWLRQVVXFKDVPHDQVRIVXEVLVWHQFHDQGKHDOWKFDUH´30. 
In this sense, human rights are essential in their constraining and enabling functions, 
that is, in their capacity to restrain the power of some actors and/or institutions and at the same 
time enable agency of other actors.31 
 
Constraining rights are those rights necessary for limiting power, such as fairness rights 
(for example, due process, nondiscrimination, equal treatment) and rights protecting 
individual liberty and security (freedom of thought, physical integrity, and the like). 
Enabling rights are those that make effective agency possible, including civil and 
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political rights (petition, assembly, expression) and social and economic rights 
(education, health care, subsistence).32 [emphasis in the original] 
 
Human rights in their expression as constraining and enabling rights are vital for democratic 
processes:33 First, they apply, in theory, universally regardless of jurisdictions, persons or 
places. Second, they are supposed to be binding for state and non-state actors alike. Third, their 
implementation can rely on multiple governance mechanisms, as is the case in global 
governance, and is not restricted to one singular political framework. Fourth, they can be 
viewed as normative aims describing what state and non-state actors should achieve. In this 
view, human rights obligations extend to all actors in global governance, including states, civil 
society actors and transnational companies, wiWK WKH DLP WR FUHDWH ³HWKLFDO VWDQGDUGV IRU
OHJLWLPDWHJRYHUQDQFHDWDOOOHYHOV´34. 
 
Participation 
No less essential for advancing democratic processes is the creation of mechanisms which 
facilitate the meaningful participation of actors other than the state in decision-making 
processes. Given the essential role of actors from the private sector and civil society in Internet 
governance, ways need to be found to include these new voices in decision-making processes. 
Many scholars emphasise the importance of civil society actors in this regard.35 They are very 
often predisposed to advocating the promotion of human rights and global public goods by 
exercising pressure on the states and mobilising against powerful state and private interests. A 
higher participation of non-state actors in global decision-making processes potentially benefits 
the emergence of new ideas, perspectives and approaches to global challenges.36 
Although more participation of non-state actors may benefit the democratisation of 
global processes, it would be misleading to assume that their mere participation will make 
global processes automatically more democratic. In the complex realm of civil society actors, 
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we very often encounter similar hierarchies and power imbalances as in the realm of states with 
those from the rich countries in the global north exercising more influence in global governance 
mechanisms than those from the developing countries in the global south.37  
Effective participation of these non-state actors in decision-making processes is still an 
exception and very often does not extend beyond a complementary role in agenda-setting, 
implementation and enforcement.38 Consequently, different degrees of participation exist. 
Passive participation (observer status or consultation) can still be considered the norm for the 
participation of civil society actors in global decision-making mechanisms. Active participation 
(presenting information, making statements in the decision-making body or contributing to the 
implementation of policies) is always quite common. Yet, the most powerful degree of 
participation, full participation (voting rights and agenda-setting power), remains an exception 
and its promotion is the key to more democratic global governance mechanisms.39  
 
Accountability 
The creation of accountability mechanisms constitutes a third prominent element in the 
GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQRIJOREDOSURFHVVHV$FFRXQWDELOLW\EDVLFDOO\PHDQV³WKDWVRPHDFWRUVKDYHWKH
right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to assess whether they have fulfilled their 
responsibilities in the light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they find that these 
UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV KDYH QRW EHHQ PHW´40. Accountability may be established through voting 
procedures, monitoring and policy review activities.41  
Civil society actors have played a significant role in advancing the accountability of 
global decision-making processes:42 They have called for more transparency and 
comprehensibility of decision-making processes so make these complex processes not only 
more transparent but also more comprehensible to the common citizen. They have been active 
in monitoring and review activities, naming and shaming of governments in the case of rights 
 8 
 
violations or other wrong-doing. Civil society actors have organised campaigns to create formal 
accountability mechanisms of international organisations. Civil society actors, however, only 
appear as serious actors in their advocacy and campaign efforts if they can guarantee the 
accountability of their own structures.43 
 In democratic societies, these two democratic elements, participation and 
accountability, fuse in the form of elections. On the one hand, elections are an instrument to 
hold politicians accountable to certain standards and their own campaign promises. On the other 
hand, elections provide an instrument for the common citizen to participate in the political 
process. Given the polycentric and highly fragmented nature of the global system, elections, as 
carried out in democratic nation-states, are difficult to establish, since non-state actors such as 
NGOs or corporations do not rely on clearly delineated constituencies nor are these 
organisations elected by any citizens to represent their interests.44 Given these obstacles, non-
electoral mechanisms of authorisation and accountability are much easier to establish and, when 
viewed in conjunction, do bear a potential for democratising global processes.45  
Mechanisms of authorization and accountability are institutionally distinct but mutually 
complementary means of regulating the power relationships between rulers and ruled. 
More specifically, they are mechanisms for distributing power between stakeholders 
and public political agents in such a way as to ensure that the power exercised by public 
political agents remains subordinate, in some significant respects, to the power of 
stakeholders [emphasis in the original].46  
While authorisation HQWDLOV³WKHJLYLQJRIDXWKRULW\WRDFW´DFFRXQWDELOLW\LQYROYHV³WKHKROGLQJ
WRDFFRXQWRIUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVIRUWKHLUDFWLRQV´47. How these mechanisms work together is best 
exemplified by elections. When citizens vote for candidates they are able to authorise particular 
public representatives to pursue a particular political agenda and, if unsatisfied with their 
performance, hold them to account and deny these public representatives the vote so that they 
lose their office.48 In this respect, elections are just one example, and a very powerful one 
indeed, of mechanisms of authorisation and accountability.49 And it is these two complementary 
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mechanisms which are at the root of ensuring more democratic processes. In the global sphere 
state and non-state actors need to join forces to create a similar set of complementary 
mechanisms.  
But what may these mechanisms look like in detail? Mechanisms of authorisation 
involve, first of all, mechanisms of delegation, the process of transferring responsibility to 
certain representatives.50 Second, mechanisms of authorisation also involve mechanisms of 
empowerment, the process of transferring power to the delegated representatives to take part in 
decision-making.51 7R ZRUN GHPRFUDWLFDOO\ ³HPSRZHUPHQW SURFHVVHV PXVW DOZD\V EH
contingent upon prior processes of democratic GHOHJDWLRQ´52 [emphasis in the original]. 
Mechanisms of accountability, on the other hand, involve mechanisms of transparency and 
disempowerment.53 7UDQVSDUHQF\³FDQRIWHQEHDFKLHYHGWKURXJKPHDVXUHVVXFKDVprovision 
of public access to the minutes of key decision-making meetings, details of evidence presented 
to these meetings, internal performance HYDOXDWLRQ UHSRUWV DQG VR RQ´54. Meaningful 
transparency, however, should go beyond making information public and should also include 
the obligation of the participating actors to provide reasons for their decisions.55 The second 
mechanism of accountability refers to disempowerment, the possibility to delegitimise public 
representatives through sanctions or other methods.56 
We need to keep in mind that this is a rather stylised account of mechanisms of 
authorisation and accountability which cannot be transferred identically and uniformly to global 
SURFHVVHVGXHWR³WKHDEVHQFHRIVWDEOHDQGcentralized IUDPHZRUNVRISXEOLFSROLWLFDOSRZHU´57. 
Nevertheless, both mechanisms are able to contribute to democratising global processes if 
established in a complementary way, making decision-making processes more inclusive and 
increasing the control of stakeholders over public representatives.58 
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%UD]LO¶VRUJDQLVDWLRQRIWKH1(7PXQGLDO0HHWLQJ 
After Edward Snowden had made public the NSA spy scandal in the summer of 2013 and it 
had become clear that several heads of state had been spied on by the National Security Agency 
(NSA), among them Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, the Brazilian president took bold 
action.59 Rousseff condemned the actions of the NSA and cancelled a scheduled state visit to 
the US.60 In September 2013 at the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly, Rousseff 
VSRNHRXWDJDLQVWWKH16$SUDFWLFHVDQGSURPLVHGWKDW%UD]LOZRXOG³present proposals for the 
establishment of a civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the Internet 
DQG>«@HQVXUHWKHHIIHFWLYHSURWHFWLRQRIGDWDWKDWWUDYHOVWKURXJKWKHZHE´61 In October 2013, 
after talks with the CEO of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), Fadi Chehadé, Rousseff announced that the Brazilian government would organise a 
world meeting in São Paulo to develop proposals in this regard.62  This world meeting, the 
NETmundial Global Stakeholder Meeting on the Future of the Internet, took place in São Paulo 
on the 23rd and 24th of April 2014 with more than 1,200 participants from the most relevant 
stakeholder groups in Internet governance (governments, civil society, private sector and 
academic/technical community).63 7KHPHHWLQJZDVRUJDQLVHGE\%UD]LO¶V6WHHULQJ&RPPLWWHH
CGI.br together with the Brazilian government, several International Organisations, ICANN 
and the I* organisations.64 65  
%UD]LO¶V,QWHUQHW6WHHULQJ&RPPLWWHHCGI.br is the responsible body for coordinating 
the Internet in Brazil which involved the development of the Regulatory Framework for the 
Internet in Brazil. It is striking that this Committee works with a multi-stakeholder mindset 
involving actors from all relevant sectors relevant for the governance of the Internet in Brazil. 
The Committee is composed of nine government representatives from different ministries and 
government agencies, four representatives from the private sector, four representatives from the 
non-profit sector, three representatives from the scientific and technical community and one 
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representative with notable knowledge in issues concerning the Internet, resulting in 21 
members. Although the government forms the largest group with nine representatives, it does 
not hold a majority as a single group. Instead, the Steering Committee comprises representatives 
from four different groups which have a stake in issues concerning the Internet.66   
 
The promotion of human rights 
6LPLODUWR%UD]LO¶V5HJXODWRU\)UDPHZRUNWKH1(7PXQGLDOGRFXment establishes a catalogue 
of human rights which can be seen as ethical standards to be respected and implemented by all 
state and non-state actors in global Internet governance. The future implementation of these 
standards in multiple governance frameworks would allow for more legitimate governance of 
the Internet. The human rights emphasised by the NETmundial document include freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, the right to privacy, the right to full access of online 
resources, freedom of information and access to information, the right to development via the 
Internet.67 The stakeholder groups also agreed on principles for the Internet governance process 
ZKLFK³VKRXOGEHEXLOWRQGHPRFUDWLFPXOWLVWDNHKROGHUSURFHVVHVHQVXULQJWKHPHDQLQJIXODnd 
accountable participation of all stakeholders, including governments, the private sector, civil 
VRFLHW\WKHWHFKQLFDOFRPPXQLW\WKHDFDGHPLFFRPPXQLW\DQGXVHUV´68.  
In the second part of the document, the roadmap for future Internet governance, the 
stakeholder groups agreed on improving the stakeholder process by guaranteeing its open, 
participative and transparent character, improving existing institutional structures in Internet 
governance and engaging in discussion about particular points such as net neutrality (non-
discrimination of data on the Internet) which were controversial at NETmundial and could not 
be included directly in the final document.69 However, the document indirectly emphasises the 
principle of net neutrality by referring to the concept of an open internet and stating the right to 
freedom of expression and information.70 
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The constraining rights (right to privacy, net neutrality, etc.) establish aims to be 
achieved among all state and non-state actors to limit the power (or the abuse of power) of 
governments and private corporations vis-à-vis Internet users. The enabling rights aim to 
guarantee the protection and an expansion of political agency in global Internet governance. 
The protection of political agency refers to the rights of Internet users to freedom of expression, 
freedom of information, access to information, etc., whereas the expansion of political agency 
is based on the agreement to establish more participatory governance processes for the better 
involvement of non-state actors.  
Although the final NETmundial declaration is not legally binding, it can be 
characterised as a hallmark of global Internet governance. Wolfgang Kleinwächter, an expert 
on global Internet governance and active participant of NETmundial, argues that the 
NETmundial document might be compared with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) of 1948, also legally non-ELQGLQJ IRU ³>Q@HYHU EHIRUH LQ WKH history of Internet 
governance had there been a document with such broad political support both from 
JRYHUQPHQWVDQGQRQJRYHUQPHQWDOVWDNHKROGHUV´71. The NETmundial document directly refers 
WRWKH8'+5E\VWDWLQJ³+XPDQULJKWVDUHXQLYHUVDODVUHIOHFWHGLQ the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and that should underpin Internet governance principles. Rights that people 
have offline must also be protected online, in accordance with international human rights legal 
REOLJDWLRQV>«@´72.   
 
Full participation of non-state actors 
The whole meeting was chaired by Virgílio Fernandes Almeida, a member of CGI.br and 
secretary of the IT department of the Brazilian Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation.73 The objective of the organisers was to develop a charter of principles and a 
roadmap for future action in global Internet governance. The preparation of these documents 
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ZDV PRGHOOHG RQ WKH SRVLWLYH H[SHULHQFHV PDGH LQ WKH HODERUDWLRQ RI %UD]LO¶V 5HJXODWRU\
Framework. The organisers prepared a zero draft text which was made public and could be 
accessed by governments, private sector organisations, civil society and the technical and 
academic community for comments and suggestions.74 The consultation process was, as in the 
case of the Regulatory Framework, divided into two rounds.75 From 14 February to 08 March, 
the NETmundial organisers received content contributions via its NETmundial website. Based 
on these contributions, the Brazilian Steering Committee CGI.br prepared a draft of the 
document text at its meeting on 31 March and 01 April in São Paulo, which was then made 
public on 11 April for the second round of comments.76 In the first round, the NETmundial 
organisers received 188 suggestions from 46 countries and 158 institutions, while in the second 
round the organisers counted 1,370 contributions which constituted the basis for the draft text 
presented at the NETmundial Meeting.77  
7KHRUJDQLVHUVXVHGWKHFRPPHQWLQJWRRO³&RPPHQWSUHVV´DQRSHQ-source WordPress 
plug-in for social texts, which allowed every participant to track every single comment made. 
Unlike during the public consultations for the Regulatory Framework, users were not required 
to register with a user account. However, they needed to provide their full name, an email 
address and identify with one of the stakeholder groups.78 The NETmundial organisers achieved 
to create a similar environment as during the elaboration of the Brazilian Regulatory 
)UDPHZRUN DOORZLQJ XVHUV ³WR HQJDJH LQ DQ RQOLQH GHEDWH DQG FULWLTXH RQ HDFK DQG HYHU\
paragraph, ultimately turning the document into an interactive conversation with a wide variety 
RIVWDNHKROGHUVDFURVVWKHJOREH´79.   
Theoretically, the Meeting was open to everyone interested in Internet governance. 
However, due to the limitations of the venue in São Paulo to around 900 people, the organisers 
needed to be selective in the 869 applications received by civil society and the private sector.80 
The executive committee selected 500 applicants based on achieving a balance of gender, 
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geography and multi-stakeholder groups.81 7KHJRYHUQPHQWVVHQWWKHLUDSSOLFDWLRQVWR%UD]LO¶V
Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that in the end 933 participants from all four different stakeholder 
groups were selected to attend the Meeting.82 According to the organisers, governments were 
represented by 39 per cent, civil society by 17.1 per cent, the private sector by 15.1 per cent, 
the technical community by 11.7 per cent, academia by 9.3 per cent, International Organisations 
by 4.4 per cent and others, such as normal citizens, by 3.3 per cent.83  
In addition to the participants in São Paulo, CGI.br went to great lengths to assure that 
other citizens and organisations interested in the NETmundial meeting were able to take part. 
CGI.br provided the logistical material for 33 hubs in 30 cities and 28 countries worldwide, 
which guaranteed real-WLPHLQWHUDFWLRQZLWK1(7PXQGLDO¶VSOHQDU\VHVVLRQVLQ6mR3DXORDQG
commenting on the draft text.84 These hubs85 were organised by the local Internet community 
in the respective cities and countries.86 ARENA-NETmundial represents one example of such 
a hub in Brazil where the organisers interacted with Brazilian citizens in São Paulo, sharing 
knowledge on Internet governance and stimulating citizens to take part in writing comments 
and voting on particular parts of the draft document.87 Notwithstanding these efforts, Virgilio 
$OPHLGD IHDUHG WKDW WKH LVVXHV GLVFXVVHG DW 1(7PXQGLDO ³KDYH >QRW@ UHVRQDWHG ZLWK PDQ\
SHRSOHEH\RQGWKRVHGLUHFWO\LQYROYHGRULQWHUHVWHGLQWKHVXEMHFW´88.  
The meeting itself including the public consultations in the weeks prior to the meeting 
was coordinated and planned by a multi-stakeholder board which created four committees. All 
these committees were composed of representatives from the different stakeholder groups.89 
The plenary meetings were also organised in an innovative way respecting the balance of the 
stakeholder groups. The organisers installed four microphones, one for each stakeholder group 
(governments, civil society, private sector and academic/technical community), and limited 
comments and interventions to two minutes.90 Participants had to queue up behind the 
respective microphone of their group. Due to the real-time connections with the remote hubs, 
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one full round of comments consisted of six slots, the first four slots for the respective 
stakeholder groups at the Plenary Session in São Paulo, and after them, two slots were reserved 
for comments and contributions from the hubs.91 The discussions were divided into two parts. 
On the first day of the meeting the discussion concentrated on the fundamental principles, 
whereas on the second day the discussion revolved around governance issues.92  
The Brazilian Internet Steering Committee was able to create an environment which 
allowed all stakeholder groups active and full participation in the development of the outcome 
document. Although the governments were still in the majority vis-à-vis other stakeholder 
groups, they were stripped of their traditional privilege of being the only actors with final 
decision-making power. Instead, the negotiation of the final document was truly participatory 
considering the involvement of all stakeholder groups with equal rights of full participation in 
the public consultations in the two months prior to the meeting and the organisation of the actual 
meeting.  
But not everything was sunshine and roses. The whole process can definitely be 
improved. Powerful corporations, for instance, tried to take advantage of the huge influence 
they have on governments and achieve a more favourable language through lobbying efforts. 
Governments fell back into diplomatic horse trading and civil society actors were not happy at 
all with the language on net neutrality, the most controversial issue of the meeting which could 
not be turned into one of the Internet principles.93 (YHQLQWKHDGRSWLRQRI%UD]LO¶V5HJXODWRU\
Framework net neutrality had been one of the most controversial issues. In the end, however, it 
could be included in the Regulatory Framework.94 Although representatives from civil society 
organisations were disappointed that NETmundial did not significantly change the existing 
balance of power which clearly favours the powerful states and corporations, they conceded 
that the organisation of the meeting was in many respects highly innovative and original, 
pointing to an alternative, more inclusive, way of generating international norms as opposed to 
 16 
 
a government-led approach.95 Deborah Brown from the civil society organisation Access Now 
UHPDUNHG WKDW ³1HW0XQGLDO ZDV DQ H[DPSOH RI D PHHWLQJ LQ ZKLFK DOO VWDNHKRlders were 
RVWHQVLEO\ RQ HTXDO IRRWLQJ´96. Gabrielle Guillemin from the organisation Article 19 
HPSKDVLVHGWKDW³[u]nlike traditional international fora such as the UN Human Rights Council, 
NETmundial gave an opportunity to civil society, private actors, governments and Internet users 
WRH[SUHVVWKHLUYLHZVDQGFRQFHUQVLQDKLJKO\RSHQDQGWUDQVSDUHQWPDQQHU´97. And Deborah 
'RQDKRHIURP+XPDQ5LJKWV:DWFKXQGHUOLQHGWKDWWKH1HWPXQGLDO0HHWLQJUHSUHVHQWHG³D
far more inclusive and transparent approach than any process where only governments have a 
VHDWDWWKHWDEOH´98. Notwithstanding criticism from civil society (regarding net neutrality), the 
private sector (regarding privacy) and governments like Russia, China, India and Cuba, the final 
document was approved by all stakeholder groups, which speaks in favour of the strong 
legitimacy of a document jointly developed through the full participation of all participants 
having a stake in the issue.99 
 
Mechanisms of authorisation and accountability 
In terms of transparency, the NETmundial Meeting was in many respects exemplary. Not only 
was it possible for all participants, either those at the summit location or those at the hubs, to 
comment on the documents in process and track comments and changes made by other 
participants. All these comments and track changes made during the consultation process can 
still be followed up on the official website of NETmundial (netmundial.br/references). In 
addition, the very same website provides public access to the web interface of the NETMundial 
document where all comments made can be tracked paragraph by paragraph including the name 
of the commenting person and her/his stakeholder group (civil society, academia, government 
and private sector). A separate document prepared by the Executive Secretariat provides 
information about the comments received throughout the whole consultation process and 
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YDULRXVWDEOHVGHWDLOLQJWKHFRPPHQWV¶RULJLQVVWDNHKROGHUJURXSVVSHFLI\LQJWKHH[DFWGD\V
the comments were made and to which section in the document the comments were dedicated. 
Apart from these meticulous efforts in providing a transparent consultation process, the same 
UHSRUWH[SODLQVWKH6HFUHWDULDW¶VIRUPDWWLQJDSSURDFKDQGKRZWRUHDGWKHHQWLUHGRFXPHQWZLWK
comments, track changeVDQGWKH6HFUHWDULDW¶VVXPPDULHVDQGUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVIRUWKHILQDO
text.100   
The same website also provides access to a spreadsheet including a list of all comments 
made and the exchanges of arguments during the consultation process, a list with information 
about all participants (including the websites and contact information of every single hub) and 
additional documents such as document proposals by various governments, policy briefs and 
other contributions from private sector, civil society and academic organisations to enrich the 
debate on the development of the outcome document. If all this were not enough, the website 
also provides transcriptions of the various sessions taking place during the two days of the 
NETmundial meeting and complete videos, in several languages (English and multilingual), of 
the morning and afternoon sessions of the two days which amount to more than 20 hours of 
video footage of the meeting still accessible as Youtube videos.  
This effort in holding the various stakeholder groups accountable to each other through 
a highly transparent meeting was complementary with the mechanisms of authorisation 
established by the NETmundial organisers. They selected around 900 representatives from 
various stakeholders and established a setting in which all representatives, independent of their 
filiation, confronted one another on an equal footing. In this setting, representatives of non-state 
actors were given the authority to speak and comment on behalf of their respective organisation 
(delegation) which considerably empowered them in contributing to the development of the 
outcome document (empowerment). At the same time, these representatives found themselves 
on an equal footing with government representatives. This mechanism of authorisation 
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(delegation and empowerment) was also extended to representatives from civil society, 
academia and the private sector from all around the world who convened at the hubs and were 
allowed to intervene with their comments during the meeting. Through a transparent decision-
making process in which all stakeholders had access to documents and minutes of the meetings 
and could track the contributions and comments of the others all participants were mutually 
held to account. Everyone was allowed to comment on the contributions of the other, including 
participants from the 33 hubs established all around the world.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Brazil, embodied by its Internet Steering Committee, demonstrated how to organise a global 
multi-stakeholder meeting on a democratic basis which achieved to develop, for the first time 
in Internet governance, an Internet human rights framework with non-binding Internet 
principles. The organisers achieved to create a democratic setting in which all stakeholders had 
HTXDO ULJKWV DQGZHUHDOORZHG WRHTXDOO\ FRQWULEXWH WR WKH ILQDOGRFXPHQW%UD]LO¶V ,QWHUQHW
Steering Committee designed a truly global public consultation process which, facilitated by 
the latest Internet communication tools, allowed the global internet community to participate in 
the Meeting and share ideas on how to improve the final document for the benefit of the whole 
global internet community. In RWKHU ZRUGV %UD]LO¶V VSHFLILF FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH JUDGXDO
democratisation of global Internet governance lies in the following idea: that all relevant 
stakeholders need to be included as equal partners in the global decision-making process to find 
rights-based solutions to global challenges.  
However, the NETmundial experience was not without deficiencies. Here, two points 
are of particular relevance. First, the relatively low participation rate in online public 
consultations is a major preoccupation for policy-makers and scholars alike.101 The second 
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point refers to the selection mechanisms of stakeholders. From their experiences of organising 
NETmundial Almeida et al. enumerated a number of elements which still need improving. 
Among them the question of how to identify an adequate set of stakeholders for a particular 
issue, which mechanisms and criteria should be used for a better selection of stakeholder 
representatives, how to guarantee a fair power balance between powerful NGOs and private 
actors and those which are much less influential.102 An online public consultation process, as 
carried out by NETmundial, definitely provides the opportunity for all possible stakeholders 
interested in a particular issue to participate. The online process eliminates many barriers and 
obstacles to participation which exist in the offline world, as, for instance, when it comes to 
selecting a small number of stakeholder representatives for the venue of a physical meeting 
such as NETmundial. Here again, the organisers were creative and established 33 hubs all 
around the world for those who were not able to participate in the meeting in São Paulo. Of the 
more than 800 applications received from civil society and the private sector, the organisers 
selected more than half of them based on a balance of gender, geography and stakeholder group.  
While the NETmundial meeting was regarded a resounding success, it is fundamental 
to take advantage of the momentum and implement the Internet principles on a global scale. 
Otherwise, the credibility of this Internet Human Rights Charter and the innovative organisation 
RIWKHZKROHPHHWLQJFRXOGEHVHULRXVO\GDPDJHG6LQFH%UD]LO¶V5HJXODWRU\)UDPHZRUNWKH
guiding example for the Brazilian organisers of the NETmundial, was adopted in 2014, its 
regulation and implementation have been slow and, in some parts, non-existent which puts in 
danger the credibility of the whole framework.103  
With authoritarian countries like China and Russia clamping down on internet 
freedoms, the broadened surveillance culture in Western countries and the unchecked power of 
big US-based corporations like Google or Facebook, it will be an extraordinary challenge to 
implement the new Internet principles. At least, with these global principles in place civil 
society actors and progressive states have an additional tool at their disposal to exercise 
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pressure, promote Internet freedoms and hold other actors accountable. And Brazil can be 
considered a progressive state here. In the UN Human Rights Council in late 2014, a Brazilian-
German initiative was responsible for the creation of the post of a Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Privacy in the Digital Age with the mission to collect information on the situation of 
digital privacy around the world.104 This initiative is certainly a first step forward in the 
implementation of the Internet Human Rights Charter. Within Brazil, the Regulatory 
Framework and the NETmundial Principles serve civil society actors as convenient tools to 
keep their pressure high and name and shame the government for inaction or false promises 
ZKLFK PD\ EH YHU\ GDPDJLQJ WR WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO SUHVWLJH JDLQHG IURP WKH
adoption of its Regulatory Framework and the organisation of the NETmundial meeting.  
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